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EQUITABLE GATEWAYS: TOWARD EXPANDED 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF 
STATE-COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
Eve Brensike Primus* 
State prisoners who file federal habeas corpus petitions face a maze of procedural 
and substantive restrictions that effectively prevent almost all prisoners from 
obtaining meaningful review of their convictions. But it is a mistake to think that 
habeas litigation is just a Kafkaesque nightmare with no constructive potential. 
Federal courts do sometimes cut through the doctrinal morass to consider state 
prisoners’ claims, relying on what this Article terms “equitable gateways” to 
federal habeas relief. Litigants and courts generally underestimate the potential 
these gateways offer, with the result that habeas litigation does not focus on them 
as often as it should. 
Here I consider one important category of equitable gateways animated by a 
concern about ensuring that federal claims get fair consideration in the courts. 
When a federal court believes that a state prisoner has not yet had a full and fair 
opportunity to present his or her federal claims and have them fairly considered, it 
is more likely to bypass procedural and substantive restrictions on review. But state 
prisoners often fail to highlight certain kinds of fair consideration failures, thus 
depriving themselves of potential access to the equitable gateways. This Article 
suggests that this blind spot is partly due to the history of fair consideration 
principles: for decades, the idea of a fair consideration gateway was a central 
feature of proposals for further restricting the scope of federal habeas review. In 
current circumstances, however, fair consideration is a rubric for expanded habeas 
review, and habeas litigants should take note. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions is a mess. The 
Supreme Court has described the Great Writ as “a bulwark against convictions that 
violate fundamental fairness,”1 but one empirical study revealed that fewer than 
0.3% of noncapital state petitioners get any form of federal habeas relief, and more 
than half of the prisoners who file habeas petitions have their petitions dismissed on 
procedural grounds without a federal court ever considering the merits of the 
underlying constitutional claims.2 In a world with a properly rights-protective 
criminal justice system, the vanishingly small rate of habeas relief might just reflect 
the absence of unlawful convictions. But given substantial evidence that states 
systematically violate criminal defendants’ constitutional rights3 and the large 
                                                                                                                
 1. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).  
 2. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS 6, 9 (2007) [hereinafter KING REPORT], 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf.  
 3. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (documenting systemic violations of defendants’ rights in the 
states); see also Lynn Adelman, Who Killed Habeas Corpus?, DISSENT MAGAZINE Winter 
2018, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/who-killed-habeas-corpus-bill-clinton-aedpa-
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numbers of wrongful state convictions that have come to light,4 the rate of relief 
cannot be explained on the grounds that everything is basically fine. Fundamental 
fairness is often violated, and 0.3% is not much of a bulwark. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that habeas litigation is just a 
Kafkaesque nightmare with no constructive potential. Now and then, federal courts 
cut through the doctrinal morass and consider the claims of state prisoners.5 When 
they do, they rely on devices that I will call “equitable gateways” to federal habeas 
review. Attention to those equitable gateways can provide insight into the federal 
courts’ implicit vision of the proper scope of habeas review of state criminal 
convictions and help draw a map for obtaining more robust federal review of state 
criminal convictions going forward. Someone who knows where the gateways are 
and litigates toward them has a better chance of getting through. 
The equitable gateways to habeas review fall into two basic categories. 
Federal courts are more willing to look past procedural barriers and provide more 
robust merits review when state prisoners show either that they are innocent or that 
they did not have a full and fair opportunity to have their federal claims adjudicated 
in the convicting state’s system.6 Much has been written about the scope of equitable 
exceptions focused on innocence.7 In this Article, I focus on the latter interest, which 
I refer to as an equitable concern about fair consideration.8 The fair consideration 
                                                                                                                
states-rights (“As a federal judge, I have observed a considerable number of cases where state 
courts overlooked clear constitutional violations . . . .”). 
 4. See Brandon L. Garrett, Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions, in 3 
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 193, 
193–94 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Cf. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 166–67 (1970–71) (arguing that federal habeas review of 
state criminal convictions should focus on preventing the conviction of innocents and 
ensuring that states provide full and fair procedures to adjudicate federal claims). I don’t mean 
to suggest that fair consideration and innocence concerns are the only factors that matter to 
federal habeas courts. In capital cases, the federal courts have different concerns about states’ 
implementation of the death penalty. And, when they are reviewing the merits of a claim, the 
federal courts sometimes get upset when state courts misstate federal law or apply it in 
egregiously unreasonable ways. That said, when it comes to the many restrictions on federal 
habeas review of noncapital state prisoners’ cases, federal courts seem most willing to bypass 
those restrictions when there are fair consideration or innocence concerns. 
 7. See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. 
REV. 417 (2018); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and 
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691–712 (1990); 
Friendly, supra note 6. 
 8. In so doing, I build on recent scholarship that is focused on determining as a 
descriptive matter what motivates federal courts to provide more robust review of state-court 
convictions in certain cases and building off of that to consider the future trajectory of the 
doctrine. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519–20 
(2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court has adopted a fault-based approach); Justin Marceau, 
Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2071–
72 (2014) (arguing that recent cases suggest a move to a greater focus on the fairness of 
procedures rather than innocence). 
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concern is not directly about underlying rights violations. The animating worry is 
not whether a prisoner was convicted after, say, the improper concealment of 
evidence under Brady v. Maryland9 or an inappropriate jury-selection process under 
Batson v. Kentucky.10 Instead, the concern is that the prisoner has had no real chance 
to present such claims to a court and have them fairly adjudicated.11 If a state 
prisoner has not had a full and fair opportunity to have federal claims considered, 
there are equitable gateways that permit the prisoner to bypass the procedural and 
substantive restrictions on the scope of federal habeas review and get the underlying 
federal claims fully considered in federal court.12 These equitable gateways offer 
powerful paths to more meaningful federal review of state-court criminal 
convictions. 
But litigants and courts generally underestimate the potential these 
gateways offer, with the result that habeas litigation does not focus on them as often 
as it should. On the contrary, many courts and litigants think of these gateways as 
quite narrow. The reason is partly historical. Fair consideration doctrines are often 
traced back to Justice Jackson’s separate opinion in Brown v. Allen13 criticizing 
federal review of state-court criminal convictions. Focusing on the importance of 
finality and the inevitable conflict with states that results from federal review, Justice 
Jackson opined that federal courts should typically not entertain habeas petitions.14 
But he carved out a narrow exception to that prohibition: he would have permitted 
federal review if a petitioner “shows that although the law allows a remedy, he was 
actually improperly obstructed from making a record upon which the question could 
be presented.”15 Stated differently, Justice Jackson thought federal habeas review 
was appropriate if a state prisoner had been unfairly prevented from fully presenting 
his federal claims earlier. 
Professor Paul Bator built on Justice Jackson’s fair consideration idea in a 
famous 1963 law review article.16 Like Jackson, Bator argued that a state prisoner 
should have a full and fair opportunity to have his federal claims considered in state 
court.17 Also like Jackson, Bator made this argument in the context of arguing for a 
                                                                                                                
 9. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 10. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 11. Of course, the lack of a real opportunity to have federal claims considered is 
problematic precisely because the system wants to stop the underlying rights violations. But 
the equitable concern about fair consideration is agnostic about whether a rights violation has 
occurred in any given case. The goal is to ensure that federal claims are fairly considered so 
that rights violations will be corrected when they do occur. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. 344 U.S. 443, 532 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. at 534–45. 
 15. Id. at 545. Justice Jackson also had one other exception: if the petition raised 
a jurisdictional question involving federal law on which the state law allowed no access to its 
courts. See id. 
 16. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). 
 17. Professor Bator referred to fair consideration problems as “failures of 
process,” noting that the relevant question is “whether the processes previously employed for 
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narrowing of the scope of federal habeas review.18 In the 1960s, federal habeas 
courts often relitigated claims that had been previously adjudicated and decided 
against the petitioners in state court.19 Bator argued that such relitigation was 
inefficient and also undermined the state’s interest in the finality of its criminal 
convictions: in his view, one and only one opportunity to have federal claims 
considered was sufficient.20 Experts who favored reducing federal-court review 
regularly cited Professor Bator’s article and Justice Jackson’s language, while 
liberals shunned the fair consideration approach, arguing instead for theories that 
supported broader approaches to federal habeas review.21 
As the Supreme Court took its conservative turn in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
adopted much of Professor Bator’s approach, citing his article to support 
contractions in the scope of federal habeas review.22 When Congress further 
restricted federal habeas review in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA),23 it also incorporated fair consideration ideas. That Statute 
imposed many obstacles to habeas review, both procedural and substantive. 
Alongside those obstacles, the Statute carved out exceptions for cases in which state 
courts had not provided one real opportunity for the adjudication of federal claims.24 
But those exceptions have seemed narrow to most habeas lawyers who rightly 
perceive AEDPA as erecting a maze of obstacles to federal habeas review.25 More 
generally, many litigants and judges today understandably perceive the equitable 
gateways provided by the fair consideration approach as narrow precisely because 
that approach has long been championed by people whose aim has been to constrict 
the scope of habeas review.26 
                                                                                                                
determination of questions of fact and law were fairly and rationally adapted to that task.” See 
id. at 455. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 466–532 (providing for de novo review of legal claims 
raised in federal habeas petitions); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) 
(creating a preference for evidentiary hearings in federal court and noting that “the power of 
inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary”). 
 20. See Bator, supra note 16, at 444–53 (1963). 
 21. See Primus, supra note 3, at 4 (collecting the different approaches). 
 22. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 77 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–66 (1996). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See, e.g., Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of 
Successive Claims of Innocence:  A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled With The AEDPA 
to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 75, 78 (2005) (“[T]he current federal habeas corpus system is not unlike a 
maze filled with wrong turns, funhouse mirrors, and dead ends that one must try to navigate 
before attaining the evermore elusive goal of meaningful federal habeas review.”); Stephen 
Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution:  Fairness vs. “Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 
318 (1999) (describing federal habeas as a “maze of procedural barriers”); 15 No. 14, CRIM. 
PRAC. REP. 2, For Habeas Corpus, to be “Held” is to be “Made” (July 2001) (noting that 
“habeas corpus rules have long presented a maze of traps for the unwary”). 
 26. See, e.g., Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2061 (2017) (describing as 
“narrow” the Supreme Court’s exceptions to the procedural default bar); Sawyer v. Whitley, 
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Much has changed, though, since Justice Jackson and Professor Bator 
wrote about fair consideration. States have now adopted Byzantine postconviction 
processes of their own—processes that often create only sham opportunities for 
prisoners to raise federal claims.27 In particular, what prevents prisoners from raising 
their claims is often not a single state rule but the interaction of multiple state rules 
and procedures in nonobvious ways, such that what, on paper, looks like a process 
allowing the adjudication of federal claims is, in reality, nothing of the kind.28 The 
Supreme Court recently recognized that, in light of these complex state procedures, 
it must look at how state postconviction processes operate in practice to determine 
whether litigants have real opportunities, rather than merely theoretical ones, to have 
their federal claims considered.29 
The Supreme Court’s willingness to look at how multiple state 
postconviction procedures interact in practice to determine whether state prisoners 
have realistic opportunities to have their federal claims considered is potentially 
revolutionary. It opens the door to arguments about systematic ways in which state 
procedures unfairly burden state prisoners’ abilities to raise federal claims. In this 
Article, I argue that advocates and courts should capitalize on these opportunities to 
broaden courts’ understanding of fair consideration and provide a roadmap for how 
they might do it. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I offer a brief overview of the 
federal habeas review system for state-court criminal convictions, including a 
description of the many procedural and substantive roadblocks that state prisoners 
encounter when attempting to obtain relief. In Part II, I explore the fair consideration 
doctrine’s equitable gateways and explain how concerns about a lack of access to 
adequate state processes often motivate federal courts to look past obstacles to 
federal habeas review. As Part II explains, a state prisoner’s lack of access to the 
state courts often results from an overly complicated state procedural regime or even 
state misconduct. On other occasions, however, the lack of access arises from causes 
that are not the state’s doing: a prisoner who suffers from a severe mental defect or 
an unforeseen medical emergency might be unable to present federal claims to a 
                                                                                                                
505 U.S. 333, 358 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“This Term has witnessed the 
continued narrowing of the avenues of relief available to federal habeas petitioners seeking 
redress of their constitutional claims.”); Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 317 (describing the 
“increasingly strict” fair consideration tests adopted by the Rehnquist Court). 
 27. See Lee Kovarsky, Structural Change in State Postconviction Review, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 447–52 (2017) (discussing problems in state postconviction 
regimes); Eve Brensike Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural 
Approach to Adequacy Doctrine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75, 96–105 (2017) (discussing the 
evolution of state postconviction review systems in the states and explaining how states have 
created complicated procedural regimes that often do not give prisoners a real opportunity to 
raise their federal claims). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (permitting a state prisoner to 
bypass procedural restrictions on federal habeas review because the state postconviction 
procedures, considered together, effectively did not permit him to raise his ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in the state courts); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 
417 (2013) (extending the holding in Martinez to a state in which the same problematic 
procedures existed as a de facto matter). 
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state adjudicator. So long as the reason why the prisoner did not have an adequate 
opportunity to present those claims is external and not fairly attributable to the 
prisoner, the equitable principles of fair consideration apply. 
Part III then explores how litigants can and should use the animating 
principles behind these equitable gateways to broaden procedural bypasses and 
inform the standard of review for merits determinations in federal court. I argue that 
state prisoners often fail to highlight fair consideration failures in ways that could 
broaden the scope and impact of federal habeas review, and I offer some concrete 
suggestions for ways to expand upon already-existing fair consideration gateways. 
If federal habeas review is to serve as a check against fundamental unfairness in 
state-court processes, it is time to reconsider how these equitable gateways apply in 
today’s world with today’s state postconviction review systems. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL HABEAS 
REVIEW 
The writ of habeas corpus permits a prisoner to file a civil action in federal 
court asking a judge to order the warden of the prison where he or she is being held—
the one who has (“habeas”) the prisoner’s body (“corpus”)—to release the prisoner 
from unlawful custody.30 Originally, the writ was available only before conviction 
and only to establish that sufficient legal cause existed for a prisoner’s detention.31 
A court of competent jurisdiction determined guilt or innocence, and habeas corpus 
was not intended to disturb that. Legal errors were to be corrected on appeal, and 
“the Great Writ” was designed to protect against detention by the arbitrary will of a 
public official without sufficient legal cause.32 
After the Civil War, Congress and the Supreme Court were concerned 
about state abuse of the criminal process to systematically violate some citizens’ 
rights and wrongfully imprison disfavored minority community members and those 
sympathetic to them.33 To protect against wrongful convictions and unfair state 
criminal procedures, Congress gave the federal courts jurisdiction to entertain 
postconviction habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners who claimed that their 
convictions were obtained in violation of their federal constitutional rights.34 
                                                                                                                
 30. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 195 (1830). 
 31. Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review 
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1995). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State 
Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 426 (1961) (“In 1867, Congress 
was anticipating Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the implementation of the post-
war constitutional Amendments.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 752 (1987) (describing congressional concern about Southern state 
policies); see also Forsythe, supra note 31, at 1112 (discussing the congressional records). 
 34. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241–54 (2006)). 
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Today, the vast majority of federal habeas petitions are postconviction 
petitions filed by state prisoners.35 Initially, postconviction federal habeas review of 
state prisoners’ constitutional claims was de novo, and there were few procedural 
obstacles to obtaining relief.36 But with the incorporation of the criminal-procedure 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in the 1960s and the draconian sentences that came 
with the War on Drugs, federal habeas dockets exploded.37 Concerns about 
federalism, finality, and conservation of judicial resources led Congress and the 
federal courts to create a number of procedural and substantive obstacles to federal 
habeas review. In Section I.A, I will explore the procedural barriers that state 
prisoners face when they seek federal habeas relief. Section I.B will then discuss the 
substantive obstacles. 
A. Procedural Obstacles to Review  
Many state criminal defendants have no semblance of a fair process to 
determine their guilt or innocence. They are processed through structurally 
ineffective systems populated by underfunded and overworked criminal defense 
attorneys,38 prosecutors whose incentives often are to obtain convictions and appear 
tough on crime rather than pursue just results,39 and overwhelmed trial court judges 
who are focused on docket management and often indifferent to the systemic 
mistreatment of poor people of color.40 To avoid reckoning with these failures, states 
often rely on (and even distort) state procedural rules to reject defendants’ 
constitutional claims.41 
Sadly, these problems typically are not fixed at the state appellate or 
postconviction levels. Appellate courts often rely on those same state procedural 
rules to avoid addressing preserved federal claims.42 When they do address federal 
claims, they often reject them summarily on the merits in terse, one-line orders or 
                                                                                                                
 35. See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY:  USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 48 (2011) (“By far the most 
common version of habeas corpus encountered in the federal courts today is the review of 
state criminal cases….”); KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that 1 out of every 14 civil 
cases filed in federal district courts is a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner). 
 36. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 37. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE 
LAWYER 96, 99 (1988). 
 38. E.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in 3 
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, supra 
note 4, at 121. 
 39. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, 
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 4 at 101, 102–06. 
 40. See Primus, supra note 27, at 91–92. 
 41. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 365–66 (2002) (examining Missouri’s 
distortion of two state procedural rules to prevent a defendant from presenting witnesses to 
support his alibi defense); see also Primus, supra note 27, at 84–95 (documenting how states 
use procedural rules to avoid constitutional challenges). 
 42. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 366 (discussing the state appellate courts’ reliance 
on procedural rules to avoid addressing the petitioner’s federal claims). 
2019] EQUITABLE GATEWAYS 299 
opinions.43 And many federal claims are not adequately preserved for appellate 
review. When criminal defense attorneys fail to object to constitutional problems at 
the trial level, courts deem the claims waived on appeal.44 And most states are quite 
hostile to claims of deficient trial attorney performance, relegating those claims to 
later stages of postconviction litigation when defendants won’t have attorneys to 
help raise them.45 
When these state prisoners turn to the federal habeas courts for help, they 
quickly learn that Congress and the Supreme Court have erected a complicated maze 
of procedural obstacles that they must navigate, often without the assistance of 
counsel, to have their constitutional claims considered in federal court. One wrong 
procedural step means a prisoner’s claims are thrown out of federal court altogether. 
In fact, federal judges now dismiss a majority of state prisoners’ habeas claims on 
procedural grounds.46 
Four obstacles in particular—the statute of limitations, exhaustion 
requirement, procedural default doctrine, and successive petition barrier—ensure 
that most state prisoners’ claims are never considered on the merits in federal court. 
1. Statute of Limitations  
To promote states’ interests in finality, Congress created a statute of 
limitations, requiring state prisoners to file their applications for a writ of habeas 
corpus within one year from the date on which their state judgments became final at 
the conclusion of the direct appellate process.47 Although the one-year statute of 
limitations is statutorily tolled when timely filed state postconviction petitions are 
pending,48 many prisoners fail to file on time.49 According to one empirical study, 
federal district courts dismissed 22% of habeas petitions in noncapital cases as time-
barred.50 
                                                                                                                
 43. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (discussing the frequency 
of such summary dispositions). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“No procedural 
principle is more familiar . . . than that a constitutional right . . . may be forfeited in criminal 
. . . cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having 
jurisdiction to determine it.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 45. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686–97 (2007) 
(discussing this trend). 
 46. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
 47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1996). Section (d)(1) also discusses three other 
potential, less common triggering dates for the statute of limitations: the date on which a state-
created impediment to filing is removed if the state-created impediment prevented the state 
prisoner from filing; the date on which the Supreme Court recognizes a new right and deems 
it retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; and the date on which a state prisoner 
discovers the factual predicate of a claim if the facts could not have been discovered earlier 
through the exercise of due diligence. Id. 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1996). 
 49. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
 50. Id. 
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2. Exhaustion Requirement 
The exhaustion doctrine requires state prisoners to present any 
constitutional claims that they want to raise in their federal habeas petitions to the 
highest state court first.51 The doctrine is grounded in the idea that the federal courts 
should respect their state counterparts and give the state the first opportunity to 
correct any mistake or injustice.52 If a state prisoner comes into federal court with a 
federal claim that has not been properly presented to the highest state court, and the 
prisoner still has a right under state law to raise the claim in state court, the federal 
court will deem the claim unexhausted.53 The federal court will dismiss the claim 
without prejudice to permit the prisoner to present it to the state courts first, though 
it may deny the claim on the merits if it is obviously frivolous.54 
If a state prisoner files a “mixed” federal habeas corpus petition—one that 
contains exhausted and unexhausted claims—the federal court must dismiss the 
petition.55 The Supreme Court adopted this “total exhaustion” requirement to avoid 
piecemeal litigation of state prisoners’ claims.56 A state prisoner whose mixed 
petition is dismissed may return to state court to exhaust the claims and then return 
to federal court with a totally exhausted petition (assuming that doing so does not 
create a statute of limitations problem).57 Alternatively, a state prisoner who has 
filed a mixed petition may opt to drop the unexhausted claims and amend the habeas 
petition to present only the exhausted claims.58 
3. Procedural Default Doctrine  
Procedural default and exhaustion are doctrinal cousins. If a state prisoner 
fails to take advantage of an available opportunity to litigate a claim in state court, 
the problem is a failure to exhaust. But, if a state prisoner failed to pursue an 
opportunity to present the claim to the state courts at an earlier time and that 
procedural avenue is no longer available under state law, the prisoner has 
procedurally defaulted—or waived—the underlying claim.59 Similarly, if a state 
prisoner attempts to raise a federal constitutional claim in state court, but the state 
courts refuse to consider the claim because the prisoner failed to raise it properly 
under the state’s procedural rules, the federal court will deem the claim procedurally 
defaulted and will refuse to consider the merits of the underlying constitutional 
claim out of respect for the state’s procedural regime.60 The state-court 
determination that the prisoner failed to properly present the constitutional claim 
                                                                                                                
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (1996); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 
 52. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005) (“[T]he interests of 
comity and federalism dictate that state courts must have the first opportunity to decide a 
petitioner’s claims.”). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 274. 
 54. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c). 
 55. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. 
 56. See id. at 520. 
 57. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274–75. 
 58. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 520. 
 59. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977). 
 60. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491–92 (1986). 
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under state procedural rules is deemed an adequate and independent state-law 
ground justifying the denial of relief.61 
4. Successive Petition Barrier  
Citing concerns about abusive litigation tactics, the problem of piecemeal 
litigation, and the lack of any end to litigation, Congress enacted a presumptive 
prohibition on filing more than one federal habeas corpus petition.62 Under AEDPA, 
any claim that a state prisoner presents in a second or successive habeas petition 
must be dismissed by the federal court unless the claim (a) relies on a new rule of 
law that the Supreme Court has deemed retroactively applicable or (b) relies on new 
facts that the state prisoner could not have discovered before and the new facts 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the state prisoner is innocent.63 Even 
if a state prisoner claims to fall within one of those two narrow exceptions, the 
prisoner must first get permission to file a successive petition from a three-judge 
panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals.64 One empirical study noted that about 7% of 
noncapital habeas petitions filed in district court were dismissed as successive (and 
that study did not include petitions dismissed as successive by the courts of appeals, 
which are likely to be the majority of dismissals given the procedural filing 
requirement).65 
The vast majority of state prisoners have to navigate these complicated 
procedural obstacles alone because the Supreme Court has never held that prisoners 
have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in postconviction 
proceedings.66 It is not surprising that, according to one empirical study, these four 
procedural doctrines were responsible for the dismissal of approximately 53% of 
state prisoners’ noncapital federal habeas claims in district courts.67 
B. Substantive Obstacles to Review 
The rare state prisoner who successfully manages to run this procedural 
gauntlet faces a merits review process that has become so deferential to the State 
that relief remains virtually unattainable. The Supreme Court has dramatically 
limited the scope of federal habeas review by refusing to address certain kinds of 
constitutional claims, deeming them not cognizable in habeas proceedings. In 
addition, Congress and the Court have made it difficult for state prisoners to expand 
                                                                                                                
 61. See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81 (discussing the adequate and independent state-
ground doctrine). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)–(2) (1996). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. § 2244(b)(3). 
 65. KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
 66. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held 
that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon 
their convictions and we decline to so hold today.” (citation omitted)); see also Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 67. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. And, as discussed supra Subsection 
I.A.4, that likely understates the percentage of cases dismissed on procedural grounds given 
that it does not account for the petitions dismissed as successive by courts of appeals. 
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the factual record in federal court through evidentiary hearings, created a 
presumption that state-court factual findings are correct, and imposed highly 
deferential standards of review whenever a state has already adjudicated the merits 
of a claim. 
1. Limits on Cognizable Claims  
The Supreme Court has placed multiple limits on what kinds of federal 
claims are cognizable in habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. First, in Stone v. 
Powell, the Supreme Court held that state prisoners may not raise Fourth 
Amendment challenges in federal habeas proceedings if they had a full and fair 
opportunity to raise those challenges in state court.68 The exclusionary rule exists to 
deter police officers from committing constitutional violations, and the Court 
deemed the additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule at the 
habeas stage not sufficient to overcome the government interests in finality, 
conservation of resources, and federalism.69 
Additionally, in Reed v. Farley, the Court held that not all violations of 
state prisoners’ federal statutory rights will be cognizable in federal habeas 
proceedings.70 Only federal statutory errors that amount to “a fundamental defect 
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission 
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure” will be heard.71 In 
Reed v. Farley, the Court deemed a violation of the federal interstate compact on 
detainers not fundamental enough to merit federal consideration.72 
2. Evidentiary Hearings  
Under AEDPA, federal courts may not hold evidentiary hearings on claims 
that a state prisoner failed to develop in the state courts unless the prisoner can show 
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is innocent and can also show that 
the claim relies on either a new rule of law that the Supreme Court has deemed 
retroactively applicable or new facts that could not have been discovered before.73 
The Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA to limit federal habeas review in most 
cases to the factual record created in the state courts.74 As a result, evidentiary 
                                                                                                                
 68. See 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976). 
 69. Id. at 486–95. 
 70. See 512 U.S. 339, 342 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 348 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962)). 
 72. 512 U.S. 339, 342 (1994). Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989), also 
imposes a limit on the cognizability of federal claims. After Teague, if the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognizes a new federal right after a state prisoner’s direct appellate process has 
concluded, that state prisoner presumptively is not entitled to raise a claim in federal habeas 
predicated on a purported violation of that new federal right. There are two narrow exceptions 
to this presumption, both of which illustrate to differing degrees the Court’s focus on equitable 
innocence gateways. Because I am focused here on the fair consideration gateways, I will not 
address Teague further. For a discussion of how innocence animates the Teague exceptions, 
see Litman, supra note 7, at 433–37. 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (1996). 
 74. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 
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hearings in federal court are quite rare.75 Typically, when federal courts review state 
prisoners’ claims on the merits, they do so on the basis of limited state factual 
records.76 
3. Presumption of Correctness with Respect to State Factual Findings 
Out of respect for state factfinding procedures, Congress requires federal 
habeas courts to presume that any determination of fact that a state court makes is 
correct.77 To overcome that presumption, the prisoner must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the state court’s factual determination was wrong.78 Given 
how rare evidentiary hearings are in federal court, most attempts to rebut a state 
court’s factual findings are limited to an often-anemic state evidentiary record. The 
presumption of correctness is therefore quite difficult to overcome. 
4. Deferential Standards of Review  
Section 2254(d) of AEDPA famously implemented a highly deferential 
standard of review in federal court for claims previously adjudicated on the merits 
in the states.79 A federal habeas court may only grant a prisoner relief if the prior 
state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” or if the state court’s 
legal determination “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”80 As the Supreme Court has explained, it is not enough if the state court’s 
determination of the facts or application of the law was clearly erroneous.81 Rather, 
the state court’s determination must have been patently unreasonable and “so 
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended 
in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”82 And, even if 
a habeas petitioner is able to show that the state court ignored clearly binding federal 
precedent or applied it in a patently unreasonable way, the prisoner will not get relief 
unless the error is deemed harmful, meaning that it had a substantial and injurious 
effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.83 
                                                                                                                
 75. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that, post-AEDPA, evidentiary 
hearings were granted in only 0.41% of noncapital cases). 
 76. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that “most habeas cases continue to be concluded 
without evidentiary hearings or discovery in [federal] district court”). 
 77. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. § 2254(d). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). 
 82. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). A plethora of law review 
articles criticize the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the substantive scope of federal 
habeas review. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise 
of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and 
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1224–29 (2015); Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason – Why Recent 
Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s Restrictions 
on Habeas Corpus are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 55, 70–86 (2013). 
 83. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993). 
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For all of these reasons, even a habeas petitioner who successfully 
navigates the procedural complexities has less than a 0.3% chance of winning on the 
merits.84 Many experts believe that federal habeas doctrine is convoluted, 
incoherent, and not worth the amount of time and judicial energy spent on it,85 while 
others complain that we have lost sight of the historic function of the Great Writ to 
remedy injustice and check abuses of government power.86 Perhaps most damning, 
some federal judges lament that current habeas law requires them “to place their 
stamp of approval on constitutional error.”87 While procedural and substantive 
obstacles pose challenges, the animating principles of the equitable exceptions to 
these barriers reveal possible ways to expand the scope and impact of federal habeas 
review of state prisoners’ claims. 
II. FAIR CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE’S EQUITABLE GATEWAYS 
Hidden in the procedural and substantive morass of federal habeas doctrine 
is a consistent equitable thread. When a federal court believes that a state prisoner 
has not had a full and fair opportunity to present his or her claims and have them 
fairly considered, it is more likely to bypass the procedural and substantive barriers 
to relief. To be sure, this practice is not universal. Though some federal judges are 
more willing to close the federal courthouse doors to habeas petitioners than others, 
when federal courts, including the Supreme Court, bypass procedural and 
substantive obstacles to review, they often cite concerns about ensuring that criminal 
defendants are able to have their federal claims fairly considered by at least one 
court.88 Even if there are no sure formulas for procuring more expansive federal 
habeas review, there are clear indications about what sorts of claims are more likely 
to succeed. 
Federal habeas review has historically been about ensuring that states 
provide criminal defendants a full and fair opportunity to have their federal claims 
adjudicated. After all, it was a concern about state hostility to newly created federal 
rights that first led Congress to give federal courts the power to entertain habeas 
petitions filed by state prisoners.89 Supreme Court Justices who are typically quite 
hostile to expansive federal habeas review of state convictions have agreed that 
federal courts should review claims alleging a lack of available state processes for 
vindicating federal rights.90 As Professor Bator explained it, the states have a 
                                                                                                                
 84. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. The chances in capital cases are higher 
at 12.4%. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role 
in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2009). 
 86. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 3, at 13–16 (collecting sources). 
 87. Adelman, supra note 3; see Reinhardt, supra note 82, at 1221 (describing how 
the federal courts have “embarked on a path designed to render constitutional rulings by state 
courts nearly unreviewable by the federal judiciary”). 
 88. See, e.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 425–28 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 
566 U.S. 1, 10–14 (2012); Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 631 (2010). 
 89. See supra note 33. 
 90. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 532–48 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in the result). 
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responsibility under the Due Process Clause “to furnish a criminal defendant with a 
full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case,” and if they fail 
to do so, “the due process clause itself demands that its conclusions of fact or law 
should not be respected.”91 
More broadly, federal courts have been willing to look past procedural 
defects in state prisoners’ petitions if those defects resulted from some unforeseen 
external obstacles (whether state created or not) that prevented prisoners who were 
otherwise diligently pursuing their rights from complying with the procedural 
rules.92 In those circumstances, the federal court bypasses the procedural restrictions 
on equitable grounds, because the prisoners, through no fault of their own, have 
never had a full and fair opportunity to have the federal claims considered. 
Similarly, when conducting a merits analysis, federal courts have been 
willing to evaluate claims that they otherwise would not have entertained when those 
claims were not fully and fairly considered by the state courts. The federal courts 
have been more willing to have evidentiary hearings and look past presumptions of 
correctness when the petitioner has not been able to develop a factual record in state 
court.93 And some federal judges will give less deference to state-court 
determinations that were reached based on less than a full and fair airing of the 
underlying federal claims.94  
In short, the federal courts have permitted state prisoners to bypass 
procedural obstacles to habeas review and obtain more rigorous and less deferential 
merits review when there is a demonstrated process failure in the state or some 
objective factor external to the state prisoner that has prevented that prisoner from 
obtaining a full and fair review of his or her federal claims. 
A. Bypassing Procedural Obstacles to Review 
For each of the procedural obstacles outlined above, the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts have relied on equitable doctrines to carve out exceptions—
ways petitioners can bypass those procedural obstacles—when state prisoners have 
not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their federal claims. 
1. Statute of Limitations  
The one-year statute of limitations that Congress created in AEDPA has 
proved to be a formidable procedural obstacle for many prisoners seeking federal 
habeas review.95 But, in Holland v. Florida, the Supreme Court recognized that state 
prisoners could toll that one-year statute of limitations on equitable grounds if they 
could demonstrate that they had been pursuing their rights diligently and that some 
                                                                                                                
 91. Bator, supra note 16, at 456; see also Marceau, supra note 8, at 2071–72 
(arguing that recent cases suggest “a potential shift” in the Supreme Court’s focus to prioritize 
a consideration of the fairness of state procedures). 
 92. See infra Subsection II.A. 
 93. See infra Subsection II.B. 
 94. See infra Subsection II.B. 
 95. See KING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that 22% of noncapital habeas 
petitions were dismissed as time barred). 
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extraordinary circumstance beyond their control interfered with the ability to timely 
file a petition.96 
A state’s failure to provide prisoners with access to the necessary resources 
to timely file their pleadings is a frequently invoked circumstance to justify equitable 
tolling. For example, federal courts have held that prisoners are entitled to equitable 
tolling when their inability to file on time is the result of the state (1) denying a 
prisoner reasonable access to the law library;97 (2) failing to maintain legal materials 
about AEDPA in the prison library;98 (3) denying a prisoner reasonable access to his 
legal files;99 (4) affirmatively misleading a prisoner about the available time he has 
left;100 (5) affirmatively misleading a prisoner to file the wrong document or to file 
in the wrong court or at the wrong time;101 or (6) substantially delaying the mailing 
of the prisoner’s court filings or the notice of a state-court decision on them.102 In 
all of these circumstances, state action prevents the prisoner from complying with 
the statute of limitations, thus ensuring that the prisoner will not have a full and fair 
opportunity to present the federal claims. 
In addition to state action that prevents timely filing, some federal courts 
will also equitably toll the statute of limitations when something external to both a 
state and a prisoner has prevented the prisoner from being able to get fair 
consideration of his or her federal claims in court. For example, federal courts toll 
the statute when a prisoner suffers from an extreme medical condition, whether 
physical or psychiatric, which interfered with the ability to file federal claims on 
time.103 Egregious misconduct by a state prisoner’s attorney, such as failing to 
perform basic legal research, failing to meet with or respond to client 
communications, or affirmatively misleading a state prisoner about the time 
restrictions, may lead to equitable tolling as well.104 
                                                                                                                
 96. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–52 (2010). 
 97. See, e.g., Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 98. See, e.g., Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 400–01 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 99. See, e.g., Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2014); Lott v. Mueller, 
304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 100. See, e.g., Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004). 
 101. See, e.g., Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 102. See, e.g., Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); United 
States ex rel. Willhite v. Walls, 241 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 103. See, e.g., Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
“medical conditions, whether physical or psychiatric, can manifest extraordinary 
circumstances, depending on the facts presented”); Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 
2014); Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Hunter v. Ferrell, 
587 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that severe intellectual disability may 
be sufficient to warrant equitable tolling). 
 104. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651 (2010). The Supreme Court 
has made it clear that “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple 
miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline, does not warrant equitable 
tolling.” Id. at 651–52 (internal quotations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 
327, 336–37 (2007). It must be a “serious instance[] of attorney misconduct.” Holland, 560 
U.S. at 652; see also Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 647 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ffirmatively 
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In short, when state prisoners are otherwise diligently attempting to 
vindicate their rights and an extraordinary, external factor prevents them from 
having their claims fairly considered, the statute of limitations will not prevent 
federal habeas review.105 
2. Exhaustion Requirement  
Citing equitable concerns about fair consideration, Congress and the 
federal courts have created procedural mechanisms to permit state prisoners to 
bypass, or at the very least soften, the total-exhaustion requirement. First, AEDPA 
provides that a state prisoner need not exhaust the remedies available in state court 
if the state does not provide a realistic and effective procedural mechanism for 
considering the prisoner’s federal claims.106 The state may not create remedies that 
are so confusing, numerous, intricate, or ineffective that state prisoners cannot be 
expected to comply with them.107 Nor must prisoners pursue state remedies that are 
only theoretically but not actually available to them.108 For example, excessive state-
court delay in considering a claim may render the state process ineffective.109 If 
pursuing state procedural remedies is pointless, the state has failed to provide a full 
and fair forum for adjudicating prisoners’ federal claims. This failure permits the 
state prisoner to bypass procedural obstacles to review in federal court. 
                                                                                                                
misleading a petitioner to believe that a timely petition has been or will soon be filed can 
constitute egregious professional misconduct.”); Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 803–04 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (finding extreme neglect sufficient for equitable tolling when attorney missed 
deadlines, failed to communicate with client, and gave misleading statements to client); 
Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding attorney miscalculation coupled with 
deeply misleading statements to client sufficient for equitable tolling). 
 105. In some circumstances, these external obstacles may lead the federal court to 
restart the one-year statute of limitations instead of relying on equitable tolling. See supra 
note 47. 
 106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (1996). 
 107. See, e.g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 565–70 (1947) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring). Nor must a prisoner pursue a state remedy that is already foreclosed by state law. 
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436 n.4 (1997) (noting that petitioner could bypass the 
exhaustion requirement because the Florida Supreme Court had previously rejected the very 
same challenge and there was no reason to believe that it would have decided petitioner’s 
case differently). 
 108. See, e.g., Harris v. DeRobertis, 932 F.2d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that there was a state statute that permitted untimely filing upon showing that the delay was 
not due to the prisoner’s “culpable negligence,” but emphasizing that there was not a single 
published opinion in which the State had found that standard satisfied in more than 40 years). 
 109. See, e.g., Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that an 
inordinate delay in adjudicating claims can render the state-court process ineffective); Taylor 
v. Hargett, 27 F.3d 483, 485 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that a delay of more than two years in 
state appellate processes is presumptively sufficient to deem the state remedy futile and 
excuse exhaustion); Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062, 1066–69 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that a state prisoner who has already waited two years for his state-appointed appellate 
defender to file a brief and is told by the defender’s office that it will be another two years 
before any brief is filed, has no effective appellate remedy). 
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In addition, the federal courts have also developed the stay and abeyance 
procedure, which is grounded in equitable principles, to soften the impact of the 
exhaustion requirement’s total-exhaustion rule.110 When a state prisoner files a 
mixed petition containing some exhausted claims and at least one unexhausted 
claim, the stay and abeyance procedure permits the federal court to consider whether 
the prisoner has “good cause” for the failure to have presented the unexhausted 
claims to the state courts.111 If there is good cause, the claims are potentially 
meritorious, and if there is no indication that the prisoner was intentionally delaying 
consideration of the claims, the federal court need not dismiss the habeas petition 
under the total-exhaustion rule.112 Instead, the federal court should stay the 
proceedings, hold the petition with the exhausted claims in abeyance, and permit the 
state prisoner to go back to exhaust the unexhausted claims in state court.113 Upon 
the prisoner’s return, the federal court will permit the state prisoner to amend the 
petition to include the previously-unexhausted-but-now-exhausted claims.114 
This procedure prevents the exhaustion process from causing a state 
prisoner to run afoul of the one-year statute of limitations. Without the stay and 
abeyance procedure, the entire time that the federal court spent considering the 
initial mixed petition would count against the prisoner’s statute of limitations.115 The 
Supreme Court recognized the importance of the stay and abeyance procedure in 
Rhines v. Weber, noting that it would be unjust to force a state prisoner to “run the 
risk of forever losing [the] opportunity for any federal review” when there are good 
reasons why that prisoner did not present the claims earlier to the state courts.116 
Federal courts have found “good cause” to justify use of the stay and 
abeyance procedure when an objective factor, not fairly attributable to the petitioner, 
caused the failure to exhaust.117 When a state’s procedural rules are so complicated 
that a state prisoner could be reasonably confused about whether a state filing is 
timely, the Supreme Court has noted that there is good cause for filing prematurely 
in federal court to protect the underlying federal claims.118 Some lower federal 
courts have held that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel qualifies as 
good cause for filing a stay and abeyance petition.119 Others have found that a 
                                                                                                                
 110.  See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–79 (2005). 
 111. See id. at 278. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (holding that the time during 
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 116. 544 U.S. at 275. 
 117. See Whitley v. Ercole, 509 F. Supp. 2d 410, 417–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(collecting cases); Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209–10 (D. Nev. 2006) (same). 
 118. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). 
 119. See, e.g., Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2014). But see Rhines 
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prisoner’s severe mental illness may provide good cause for a failure to exhaust.120 
What all of these cases have in common is an understanding that something external 
to the state prisoner has interfered with the ability to comply with the exhaustion 
requirement and, as a result, no court has fairly considered the prisoner’s underlying 
federal claims. 
3. Procedural Default Doctrine  
There are two exceptions to the procedural default doctrine that are 
grounded in equitable concepts about ensuring that state prisoners have a realistic 
opportunity to present their federal claims in state court. One exception focuses on 
the adequacy of the state procedures themselves121 while the other focuses on 
objective, external factors that might have prevented a particular state prisoner from 
complying with a state’s procedural rules.122 
As with the exhaustion doctrine, if a state’s procedural regime does not 
give state prisoners a realistic opportunity to present their federal claims in state 
court, the federal court may deem those state procedures inadequate to bar federal 
consideration of defaulted claims.123 A state’s procedural rules can be inadequate 
because they violate due process,124 unduly burden a state prisoner’s attempts to 
raise federal challenges,125 are inconsistently applied,126 or are applied in novel and 
unforeseen ways.127 Adequacy challenges can be based on the application of one 
state procedural rule or a combination of different rules.128 They can be facial 
challenges to a state procedural rule across cases or as-applied challenges that object 
to the way a facially legitimate state procedural rule was applied in a particular 
case.129 They can be predicated on rules that exist on the books or de facto procedural 
rules that exist in state practice.130 Ultimately, adequacy doctrine judges the 
legitimacy of the state procedures themselves and asks if they provided a realistic, 
full, and fair opportunity for state prisoners to have their federal claims considered. 
Cause and prejudice, on the other hand, is an equitable exception that 
focuses on the state prisoners and asks whether they had a legitimate excuse for 
failing to comply with legitimate state procedures.131 State prisoners who failed to 
comply with state procedural rules can still have their federal claims considered on 
the merits in federal court if they can show cause (meaning an objective factor 
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 123. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 381–88. 
 124. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1955). 
 125. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 381–88. 
 126. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964). 
 127. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457–58 (1958). 
 128. See generally Primus, supra note 27 (describing the history of and different 
approaches to adequacy doctrine). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
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external to the prisoner) for failing to comply with the state’s procedural regime and 
prejudice to the outcome of their case.132 
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of cause grounds including 
interference by state officials that made compliance with the state procedural rules 
impracticable,133 the discovery of a factual or legal basis for a claim that was not 
reasonably available at the time of the default,134 ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment,135 ineffective assistance of initial postconviction 
counsel for failing to raise a substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
(IATC) claim in a jurisdiction that requires such claims to be raised in 
postconviction proceedings,136 the failure of a state to provide its prisoners with 
postconviction counsel to raise substantial IATC claims when those claims must be 
raised in postconviction proceedings,137 and constructive or actual abandonment by 
a postconviction attorney.138 
In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court emphasized the equitable concerns 
that animate these cause categories.139 It noted that ineffective performance by trial, 
appellate, and some state postconviction counsel can be cause to excuse a default, 
because “if the attorney appointed by the State . . . is ineffective, the prisoner has 
been denied fair process and the opportunity to comply with the State’s procedures 
and obtain an adjudication on the merits of his claims.”140  
4. Successive Petition Barrier 
The federal courts have created two different equitable workarounds to 
address claims raised in successive petitions when the state prisoner has not yet had 
a full and fair opportunity to have federal claims considered. First, the courts have 
restricted the definition of what constitutes a “successive” petition subject to the ban. 
If a state prisoner has a legitimate excuse for failing to have raised the claim in a 
prior habeas petition (something external to the prisoner that may have prevented 
the development of the claim), the circuit courts may deem the second-in-time 
petition not successive.141 
                                                                                                                
 132. See id. 
 133. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485–86 (1953). 
 134. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 135. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 
 136. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 271 (2012). 
 139. 566 U.S. at 13–14. 
 140. Id. at 11. 
 141. See, e.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ standard is still used by a majority of federal circuits to 
determine whether a second-in-time habeas petition is a successive petition under AEDPA, 
and noting that a petition is considered an abuse of the writ (and therefore successive) where 
the subsequent-in-time petition raises a habeas claim that could have been raised in an earlier 
petition and there is not a legitimate excuse for the failure to do so); see also Burton v. Stewart, 
549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (assuming without deciding that the “legitimate excuse” test is 
appropriate for determining whether a petition is “second or successive”). 
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For example, consider a situation discussed in Panetti v. Quarterman:142 
suppose a capital habeas petitioner is sane at the time of his conviction and sentence 
and at the time when he files his initial federal habeas petition, but he later develops 
a mental illness and becomes legally insane. If he files a second-in-time federal 
habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of executing a mentally ill person, 
the federal court should not deem the petition successive. As the Supreme Court 
explained, the claim was not ripe at the time when the first habeas petition was filed 
(because he was perfectly sane at that time), and the prisoner should not have to “run 
the risk” of “forever losing [the] opportunity for any federal review” of the claim.143 
Lower federal courts agree and have prevented a second-in-time petition from being 
deemed successive when the claim at issue could not have been presented in an 
earlier petition because it is based on law or facts that arose after the prior habeas 
proceedings.144 
Additionally, federal courts are sometimes willing to use Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen a prior federal habeas petition on equitable grounds, 
which effectively shields the state prisoner from running into the successive petition 
barrier. Rule 60(b) permits federal courts to set aside a prior judgment based on 
equitable considerations ranging from legal mistakes to newly discovered evidence 
to misconduct by an adverse party.145 Some courts have described Rule 60(b) as 
providing the federal courts with a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice 
in a particular case.”146 
                                                                                                                
 142. 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 143. See id. at 945–46 (internal quotations omitted). 
 144. See, e.g., Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 222–24 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that a claim predicated on a presidential declaration that was issued after a prisoner’s 
first petition was denied was not successive); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that a second-in-time petition challenging the denial of good-time credits was not 
successive because the disciplinary action that the prison board took occurred after the first 
petition was adjudicated). 
 145. Rule 60(b) permits a court to  
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial . . . ; (3) fraud (whether 
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct 
by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; 
or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 146. See, e.g., Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2014); Phelps v. Alameida, 
569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009); Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986); 
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 688 F. Supp. 2d 709, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Winslow v. Portuondo, 
699 F. Supp. 2d 337, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211, 233–34 (1995) (describing Rule 60(b) as a rule that “reflects and confirms the courts’ 
own inherent and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in English practice long before the 
foundation of our Republic,’ to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work 
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In the habeas context, the Supreme Court has explained that Rule 60(b) 
motions cannot be used to present new claims for relief on habeas, but they are 
procedural vehicles that habeas petitioners can use to reopen already-raised claims 
under exceptional circumstances.147 And some lower federal courts have been 
willing to reconsider prior decisions to throw a claim out on procedural grounds 
when the state prisoner can show that there is an “extraordinary circumstance”148 
that would justify granting the prisoner relief from the operation of the procedural 
barrier.149 Those extraordinary circumstances often sound in fair consideration 
concerns. 
In short, when state prisoners are prevented from presenting their federal 
claims fully in court—either because of state misconduct or the intervention of some 
external factor that they could not control—federal courts are often willing to rely 
on equitable concepts of fairness to bypass the procedural restrictions and permit the 
petitioners to raise their federal claims. 
B. Obtaining More Rigorous and Less Deferential Merits Review 
Many of the limits on the scope of federal habeas review and the deference 
shown to state-court judgments in federal habeas proceedings may disappear when 
there was no full and fair adjudication of a state prisoner’s claims in state-court 
proceedings. 
1. Expansion in Cognizable Claims  
Even as the Supreme Court was removing Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure claims from federal habeas review in Stone v. Powell, it was careful to note 
that only those Fourth Amendment claims that had been fully and fairly litigated in 
state courts would not be readjudicated in federal habeas proceedings.150 If 
petitioners can show that their search and seizure rights were violated and that the 
state courts did not provide an adequate forum for litigating the Fourth Amendment 
challenge, the federal court will consider the claims on habeas.151 
Federal courts have refused to bar federal review when a state prisoner had 
a constitutionally ineffective trial or appellate attorney who failed to properly 
present a Fourth Amendment claim.152  Federal courts have also deemed state-court 
processes inadequate to bar federal review of Fourth Amendment claims when the 
state provided no realistic opportunity to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge.153 
The inquiry into whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth 
Amendment claim in state court resembles the equitable inquiries that animate the 
                                                                                                                
inequity”) (quoting Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 
(1944)). 
 147. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005). 
 148. Id. at 538. 
 149. See, e.g., Cox, 757 F.3d at 122–24; Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135–40. 
 150. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 151. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 27.3 (7th ed. 2017) (collecting cases). 
 152. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986). 
 153. See, e.g., Monroe v. Davis, 712 F.3d 1106, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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exceptions to the procedural barriers to review. If the reason why a prisoner could 
not present a Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts would satisfy the cause 
standard under procedural default, the prisoner probably did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to present the claim. And if the state procedures would fail an adequacy 
review under the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines, they will probably 
also be inadequate to bar federal consideration of a Fourth Amendment challenge.154 
Similarly, even as the Court in Reed v. Farley155 was limiting the number 
of federal statutory claims that would be cognizable on habeas, it was careful to note 
that a statutory error that is “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure” will be heard.156 If the state court fails to provide basic, fair procedures 
for vindicating federal statutory rights, the federal courts will entertain those 
claims.157 
2. Evidentiary Hearings 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that AEPDA’s restrictions 
on the availability of evidentiary hearings only apply when a state prisoner is at fault 
for failing to develop a record in state court.158 The Court noted that a state prisoner 
“is not at fault when his diligent efforts to perform an act are thwarted, for example, 
by the conduct of another or by happenstance.”159 This fault-based inquiry relies on 
reasoning similar to that underlying the equitable exceptions to procedural barriers 
to review. If the state processes are inadequate or some unforeseen factor external 
to the state prisoner prevented him from having an opportunity to fully and fairly 
develop the record in state court, AEDPA should not stand in the way of a federal 
evidentiary hearing. And once a state prisoner walks through the equitable opening 
created by Williams160 and AEDPA’s restrictions on evidentiary hearings no longer 
apply, Supreme Court precedent often requires federal evidentiary hearings.161 
                                                                                                                
 154. See, e.g., Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that a Fourth Amendment claim should be heard if the state procedural mechanism, in the 
abstract, did not permit the state prisoner to raise a Fourth Amendment claim or if the state 
prisoner’s presentation of the claim “was in fact frustrated” because of a failure in the state 
procedural system). 
 155. 512 U.S. 339 (1994). 
 156. Id. at 348 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000).  This case involves a petitioner named Michael 
Williams and should not be confused with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), decided 
the same term, involving a petitioner named Terry Williams.  Both are habeas cases, but 
Michael Williams’s case involved a question about evidentiary hearings whereas Terry 
Williams’s case involved a discussion of the standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 159. Id. at 432. 
 160. Id. at 420. 
 161. Without the restrictions of AEDPA, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 
(1963), requires a federal evidentiary hearing “[w]here the facts are in dispute . . . [and] the 
habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court . . . .” The 
Townsend Court listed six circumstances where federal evidentiary hearings were required:  
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; 
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a 
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3. Deferential Standards of Review and the Presumption of Correctness  
The deferential standards of review in AEDPA are only triggered when the 
underlying federal claim at issue “was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings.”162 If there was no prior state-court adjudication of the claim, and the 
state prisoner is able to overcome any procedural obstacles to federal habeas review, 
the federal court’s review of the claim will be de novo.163 The difference between 
de novo review and the deferential review of § 2254(d) is vast. To obtain relief under 
§ 2254(d) a habeas petitioner must often show that the state-court decision was so 
unreasonable that “no fairminded jurist” could have reached the conclusion that the 
state reached.164 That is a tough standard to meet. As a result, a lot hinges on whether 
the federal courts think that a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state-court 
proceedings. 
Similarly, the deference given to a state court’s factual findings in § 
2254(e)(1), which contains the presumption of correctness, only applies when the 
state court has made a “determination of a factual issue.”165 Thus, it is important to 
consider when the state court has made a factual determination that is entitled to 
deference. 
The federal courts have uniformly held that a state-court decision is not an 
“adjudication on the merits” deserving of § 2254(d) deference when the decision (1) 
rested on procedural grounds, (2) failed to address the federal claim because it was 
not presented to the state court, or (3) failed to address a particular aspect of the 
federal claim because the state court resolved the claim on other grounds.166 In short, 
                                                                                                                
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not 
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation 
of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the 
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact 
hearing. 
Id. at 313. The Supreme Court later removed the fifth requirement (when the material facts 
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing) in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 
U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (noting that if a prisoner failed to adequately develop facts at a state hearing, 
the prisoner must demonstrate cause and prejudice to get a federal evidentiary hearing). 
AEDPA later displaced Keeney. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (1996). But, when AEDPA does 
not apply because the prisoner is not at fault for the failure to develop the record in state court, 
the remaining Townsend requirements still exist and often require federal evidentiary 
hearings. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (noting that AEDPA did 
not change the deference that federal courts have to grant evidentiary hearings outside of the 
narrow circumstance where the defendant is at fault for the failure to have developed the 
record in state court).  
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996). 
 163. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). 
 164. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 
 165. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996). 
 166. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 151, § 32.2 (collecting cases). Of course, if 
a state prisoner never presented the claim to the state courts, he or she will likely have to 
overcome an exhaustion or procedural default problem in federal court. 
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if the state never considered a claim, and habeas is the prisoner’s first real 
opportunity to present a federal claim, § 2254(d) deference will not apply. 
Even when the state addressed a prisoner’s federal claim, if the state’s 
factfinding procedures were inadequate (meaning that the state prisoner did not have 
a full and fair opportunity to develop the facts to support the claim), some federal 
courts will not defer to the state’s decision. Instead, they will deem the inadequate 
procedures sufficient to overcome AEDPA’s presumption that the state factfinding 
was correct and analyze the prisoner’s federal claims under a de novo standard rather 
than a deferential one. 
For example, some federal courts have held that there has been no actual 
adjudication of a claim on the merits when state prisoners have not had a full and 
fair opportunity to develop evidence in support of the claim.167 As the Fourth Circuit 
has explained, when the state courts refuse to give a prisoner an evidentiary hearing 
when such a hearing is necessary to develop the facts of the claim, and the state then 
denies the claim summarily without addressing serious factual issues raised in the 
pleadings, that is tantamount to never having adjudicated the claim in the first 
instance.168 Without an adjudication on the merits, the deferential standards of § 
2254(d) no longer apply, and the federal court will review the prisoner’s claim de 
novo.169 
Other federal courts have deemed state factfinding predicated on 
inadequate state procedures patently unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).170 The Ninth 
Circuit has noted that “where a state court makes factual findings without an 
evidentiary hearing or other opportunity for the petitioner to present evidence, ‘the 
fact-finding process itself is deficient’ and not entitled to deference.”171 Having 
determined that the state court’s determinations of fact were unreasonable, the 
                                                                                                                
 167. See, e.g., Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2015); see also 
Morva v. Zook, 821 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[a] claim is not adjudicated 
on the merits when the state court makes its decision on a materially incomplete record” and 
emphasizing that “[a] record may be materially incomplete when a state court unreasonably 
refuses to permit further development of the facts of a claim” (quoting Gordon v. Braxton, 
780 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2015))). But see Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 558, 560–62 
(6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the state court’s failure to grant an evidentiary hearing did not 
mean that the state court had failed to adjudicate the claim on the merits and noting that “[i]t 
is now clear that a state-court adjudication, even when unaccompanied by an explanation, is 
presumed to be on the merits” (citing Harrington, 562 U.S at 98–99)). 
 168. See Gordon, 780 F.3d at 202–04; see also Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 
497 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the state court had not adjudicated petitioner’s claims when 
it “deni[ed] . . . discovery and an evidentiary hearing[,] produc[ing] an adjudication of ‘a 
claim that was materially incomplete’” (citation omitted)). 
 169. Gordon, 780 F.3d at 202. 
 170. See, e.g., Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 
Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 984–86 (2012). But see 
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a full and fair hearing in 
the state is not a prerequisite for § 2254(d) deference). 
 171. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 790. 
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federal court considers the prisoner’s federal claims de novo, supplementing the 
state-court record through a federal evidentiary hearing when appropriate.172 
Finally, some federal courts will recast the prisoner’s claim as a new claim 
supported by new evidence that has not been raised before in the state.173 If a state 
prisoner had no real opportunity to present evidence in support of a claim in state 
court (either because the state-court processes would not permit it or because the 
prisoner had an ineffective lawyer who failed to try), Justice Breyer has suggested 
that the federal courts should deem the claim a new claim not previously adjudicated 
on the merits in the state.174 As he put it, “[a] claim without any evidence to support 
it might as well be no claim at all.”175 
Even if some evidence was presented in the state courts to support the 
claim, if the state prisoner later discovers a substantial amount of new evidence, it 
might be enough to “fundamentally alter” the nature of the claim and cause a federal 
court to characterize the claim as new.176 The new claim, not having been raised in 
state court, will be procedurally defaulted, but deficient state procedures may make 
the state procedural default inadequate to bar federal review.177 Alternatively, the 
ineffectiveness of state postconviction counsel in failing to develop record evidence 
in the state courts may be “cause” to excuse the prisoner’s procedural default.178 
Either way, after bypassing the procedural default, the prisoner’s claims will be 
reviewed de novo in federal court.179 
These are three approaches lower federal courts have taken to bypass the 
deferential standards of review in AEDPA and review state prisoners’ claims de 
novo because the state’s merits determination was based on an inadequate state 
process. Each of these approaches is motivated by an equitable concern about 
ensuring that state prisoners have a full and fair opportunity to present their federal 
claims and have them considered by the state courts. 
Even the harmless error doctrine, as articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson,180 
has an equitable exception. In a footnote in the Brecht decision, the Supreme Court 
noted that it was not  
                                                                                                                
 172. Id. at 778. 
 173. See, e.g., Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(relying on cases relating to exhaustion doctrine to hold that new evidence will render a claim 
unexhausted and therefore “new” if it “fundamentally alter[s]” the previously exhausted 
claim). But see Escamilla v. Stephens, 749 F.3d 380, 395 (5th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with that 
standard but noting that new evidence does not “fundamentally alter” a claim if it “merely 
provided additional evidentiary support for [a] claim that was already presented and 
adjudicated in the state court proceedings”). 
 174. Gallow v. Cooper, 570 U.S. 933, 933 (2013) (statement of Breyer, J. with 
whom Sotomayor, J. joins respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1319. 
 177. See supra notes 123–130 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012). 
 179. See Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321. 
 180. 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993). 
2019] EQUITABLE GATEWAYS 317 
foreclos[ing] the possibility that in an unusual case, a deliberate 
and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is 
combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so 
infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of 
habeas relief even if it did not substantially influence the jury’s 
verdict.181  
Thus, even as it was imposing an additional hurdle to obtaining habeas relief, the 
Supreme Court was careful to provide a bypass for prisoners whose trials were 
infected by especially egregious errors that compromised their opportunities to have 
their federal claims fairly considered. 
III. EXPANDING EQUITABLE GATEWAYS 
Federal courts should be more explicit about their willingness to cut 
through the red tape of habeas doctrine and grant relief when they believe state 
prisoners have not had a fair opportunity to have their federal claims considered. 
And habeas petitioners arguing for broader procedural bypasses and more expansive 
merits review should explicitly cast arguments in fair consideration terms when 
those concepts are applicable to their claims. 
Currently, state prisoners who never had their federal claims fully and 
fairly considered in state court often fail to paint a complete picture of the systemic 
state-process failures that stood in their way.182 This should not be surprising. Right 
now, there is no constitutional right to federal habeas counsel.183 Most state prisoners 
are indigent and cannot afford to hire federal habeas counsel.184 They either must 
proceed pro se or rely on pro bono assistance that typically comes from large law 
firms or legal institutions that do not focus on criminal cases.185 The attorneys who 
take on these cases are typically reputable generalist lawyers, but habeas litigation 
is often not their area of expertise, and they typically lack any deep experience with 
                                                                                                                
 181. Id. at 638 n.9. 
 182. I reviewed a randomly selected sample of 100 petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus in federal district courts filed by state prisoners. Not a single one raised a systemic 
state-process failure even though such claims were potentially available to a number of the 
petitioners. For example, several prisoners who were raising defaulted ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims came from states that require prisoners to raise ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claims in state postconviction proceedings but do not provide prisoners with 
attorneys to raise those claims. Yet, none of these prisoners highlighted that practice as a 
systemic state problem. See, e.g., Shipman v. Ryan, CV-08212-DLR (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2017); 
Saintlot v. Jones, CV-00494-SPC-MRM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2015). 
 183. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their 
convictions and we decline to so hold today.” (citation omitted)); see also Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 184. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 179023 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000) (noting that more than 80% of American 
criminal defendants are indigent). 
 185. See Ty Alper, Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 860 (2013) (explaining how prisoners “must petition non-profit 
organizations, law school clinics, or law firms to take their cases pro bono”). 
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state postconviction regimes.186 As a result, they might not understand the varied 
ways in which states create and implement postconviction review systems that 
routinely and effectively prevent state prisoners from having their federal claims 
fully considered. The state prisoners who proceed pro se certainly do not have access 
to this information. 
Not knowing about the systemic procedural failures in the state, most state 
prisoners focus on their individual circumstances when trying to get around 
procedural and substantive obstacles to review.187 They offer excuses for why they 
did not comply with procedural rules or why they were not at fault for failing to 
develop a sufficient factual record in state court.  
For example, a habeas petitioner might argue that he was never given a 
postconviction attorney to raise his trial attorney’s ineffectiveness, so he has “cause” 
to excuse his failure to raise the trial attorney’s ineffectiveness.188 But, if that state 
prisoner comes from a state that relegates IATC claims to state postconviction 
review and then routinely refuses to provide state prisoners with counsel at that 
stage, there is a systemic problem in the state.189 The structure and practice in that 
state court system effectively prevents prisoners from ever being able to challenge 
their trial attorneys’ performance. That claim is not getting raised as often as it 
should. The more localized excuses are known to the petitioners and their pro bono 
counsel and are easier to raise, but they are less likely to motivate a federal court to 
grant relief because they do not demonstrate an extraordinary or far-reaching fair 
consideration problem. They also are not as effective at catalyzing change because 
they provide only indirect feedback to the offending states. 
Consider the difference between the two equitable exceptions to the 
procedural default doctrine: first, cause and prejudice, and second, adequacy. Under 
a cause-and-prejudice analysis, the question is whether the petitioner is at fault for 
the procedural noncompliance.190 A finding of cause and prejudice to excuse a 
default does not send any direct message to the offending state. It merely recognizes 
that the petitioner has an excuse sufficient to justify bypassing an otherwise-
acceptable state procedural regime. In contrast, a finding that the state’s procedures 
are inadequate begins a dialogue between the federal and state courts about the 
legitimacy of the state process.191 If the federal court tells a state directly that its 
                                                                                                                
 186. See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 270–71 (2012) (describing one 
such situation). There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Some law firms have brought 
experienced public defenders in to create their pro bono programs and train their attorneys. 
See Carol S. Steiker, Keynote Address, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 
YALE L.J. 2694, 2710 (2013) (describing some of these law firms). And prisoners lucky 
enough to be represented by law school clinics at good schools often get excellent 
representation. See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent 
Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1796 (2016) (discussing these clinics). 
 187. See Primus, supra note 27, at 109. 
 188. See cases collected supra note 182. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77 (1977). 
 191. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: 
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procedures inadequately protect federal rights, it puts the state on notice and gives 
the state an incentive to fix the problem or face more federal habeas grants in the 
future.192 
Habeas petitioners should ask federal courts to consider how state 
procedural systems are structured and force them to confront the broader questions 
about whether state prisoners are given a realistic opportunity to have their federal 
claims considered. And federal courts should use their equitable discretion to bypass 
procedural and substantive obstacles to review and send a clear message back to the 
offending state that prisoners from that state will continue to receive more favorable 
federal habeas review until the state revises its procedures to give prisoners a full 
and fair opportunity to present federal claims. If the state still refuses to modify its 
procedures, federal courts can issue a stronger, constitutionally based response by 
finding systemic violations of due process or the right to counsel in that state.193 
Academics, law students, and practitioners can be helpful in this effort by 
writing about systemic problems in state postconviction regimes.194 Highlighting 
state-process failures in different states will identify potential arguments for habeas 
petitioners to raise and give them legal authority to cite in support of their arguments. 
Petitioners should also try to broaden established equitable inroads by 
applying procedural bypasses obtained in one area of habeas to other obstacles to 
habeas relief.195 Consider the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez v. Ryan196 and 
Trevino v. Thaler.197 In these cases, the Supreme Court held that there is cause to 
excuse a state prisoner’s procedural default for failing to raise a substantial IATC 
claim whenever state law requires prisoners to raise IATC claims in initial state 
postconviction proceedings and the state fails to provide prisoners with effective 
counsel to help them raise the claims at that stage.198 The equitable principles 
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animating the Supreme Court’s holdings in Martinez and Trevino have potential 
implications for other habeas doctrines, like equitable tolling. If a state creates a 
particularly complicated set of procedural requirements about the time periods for 
filing state postconviction petitions and then fails to give indigent prisoners counsel 
to help them navigate those procedural barriers, the prisoners who get trapped in the 
resulting catch-22 face the same unfairness that motivated the Supreme Court to find 
a way around the procedural default doctrine in Martinez and Trevino.199 
Martinez and Trevino also provide support to state prisoners who want to 
supplement IATC claims that were previously raised in state postconviction 
proceedings but were not adequately supported due to their pro se status or the 
ineffective representation of a postconviction attorney.200 If equitable concerns 
permit state prisoners to bypass a complete failure to raise IATC claims, they 
certainly should permit prisoners to supplement a claim that was improperly raised 
by ineffective postconviction attorneys or by pro se prisoners who, because they 
were never given access to an attorney, failed to support their IATC claim with 
enough factual evidence.201 
More generally, when faced with § 2254(d)’s deferential standards of 
review and § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness on factual determinations, 
habeas litigants should try to expand the equitable inroads that some circuits have 
already created. Litigants should argue that the state processes were sufficiently 
inadequate that the state-court decision should not be considered an adjudication on 
the merits or that the factual findings underlying the state-court determination should 
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be deemed unreasonable and the resulting determination not subject to deference. 
Once out of the constraints of § 2254(d), petitioners should rely on Williams v. 
Taylor202 to contend that they were not at fault for failing to develop the facts in state 
court and argue for federal evidentiary hearings to expand their factual records. 
Obtaining a federal evidentiary hearing to expand the state-court record dramatically 
increases the likelihood of obtaining habeas relief. According to one empirical study, 
obtaining an evidentiary hearing in federal court was associated with a 21%–32% 
increase in the likelihood of obtaining relief.203 
Finally, habeas petitioners who want to use these equitable gateways to get 
more meaningful review should situate their claims in the language and history of 
the fair consideration doctrine. A prisoner whose severe mental illness prevented 
him from timely filing his petition should argue that the illness interfered with his 
chance to have his federal claims presented to any court. That prisoner should cite 
Professor Bator,204 Justice Jackson,205 and cases like Martinez206 and Trevino207 to 
demonstrate that one important overarching goal of federal habeas review is to 
ensure that prisoners have one full and fair chance to have their federal claims 
considered. If the federal habeas court views the mental illness as an external 
obstacle that interfered with the petitioner’s ability to obtain a full and fair review 
of his federal claims, it is more likely to consider bypassing procedural and 
substantive restrictions on federal habeas review. 
These are just a few examples of ways that federal courts and litigants could 
rely on the equitable strands within the habeas doctrinal morass to open the federal-
courthouse doors to more state prisoners’ claims. Of course, more robust federal 
habeas review does not necessarily mean that more state prisoners will obtain more 
habeas relief. Some of the underlying constitutional issues that state prisoners often 
raise—like IATC—contain standards that are particularly difficult for criminal 
defendants to meet.208 But, as it currently stands, federal courts almost never address 
those constitutional standards in state cases.209 They avoid doing so by procedurally 
foreclosing the claims or saying that the state courts’ determination was not patently 
unreasonable such that they need not address whether the state’s application of the 
underlying constitutional standard was right or wrong.210 
Deferential-review standards and procedural obstacles to review 
effectively freeze out federal development of these underlying constitutional 
standards, at least as applied to state prisoners’ cases. That is problematic for a 
couple of reasons. First, there is reason to believe that some states are systematically 
underenforcing and violating criminal defendants’ rights to counsel (as well as some 
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other rights).211 Without robust federal-court review, there is unlikely to be much of 
a check on rogue state behavior.212 
Additionally, violations of some of these rights—like the right to effective 
assistance of counsel or the right to obtain material, exculpatory evidence pretrial—
are typically discovered and addressed only at the postconviction stage.213 As a 
result, federal habeas is the only real opportunity for federal courts to discuss and 
develop the scope of these rights in state cases. As some scholars have noted, federal 
courts bring a unique and important perspective to defining the content and scope of 
federal rights, and we should encourage federal and state courts to engage in a 
dialogue about the proper scope of federal rights.214  
If litigants situate their arguments in the language, history, and evolution 
of equitable doctrines about ensuring fair consideration, they are more likely to get 
robust federal habeas review while simultaneously catalyzing states to provide more 
realistic opportunities for state prisoners to present their federal claims in state court. 
Perhaps it will result in more grants of federal habeas review as well. At the very 
least, it will permit federal courts to be a part of shaping the content and scope of 
federal rights as they apply to state criminal justice systems. Obviously, working 
toward obtaining more robust federal-court review will not solve all the problems 
with the current structure of federal habeas review of state-court criminal 
convictions, but it is a start. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, scholars and judges have agreed that state prisoners should be 
entitled to one full and fair opportunity to have their federal claims considered. That 
is why fair consideration equitable gateways pierce through the otherwise-
complicated morass that is federal habeas review. It is time for litigants and federal 
courts to return to those equitable principles and think about how to expand their 
application in light of the current structure of state postconviction regimes. 
Litigants need to expose those states that are using complicated and 
confusing state postconviction procedures to avoid redressing constitutional 
violations. And federal courts need to step in and ensure that states are providing 
prisoners with a full and fair opportunity to have their federal claims developed and 
considered. States that are not giving prisoners a fair opportunity to develop factual 
records to support their federal claims should not get deference in federal courts. 
And when state prisoners come into federal court claiming that their constitutional 
rights were violated and that they have not yet had a chance to have their 
constitutional claims fully and fairly considered through no fault of their own, the 
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federal courts should listen. Perhaps then we can increase the scope of federal habeas 
review of state criminal convictions, one equitable gateway at a time. 
